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English

writing as refiguration:

lucy grealy's autobiography of a face

SUSANNAH B. MINTZ

The disabled woman who writes the story of her body transgresses a p
ularly charged ideological boundary. Her rootedness in textual flesh,
stubborn insistence on telling the tale of a broken body, defy the disembo
ied consciousness, the triumphant will and mind that are the legacy of Car
sian dualism as well as the originary point of much life writing by men.1
the same time, she may also seem to reproduce a problematically essen
ized view of female identity as meaningful only through the body. How d
such an author take advantage of post-structuralist indeterminacy, the ver
play that locates identity and autobiography alike in a slippage of pos

ties, without also relinquishing the corporeal specificity by which

demands recognition of her experience? How does the idea of creating
through writing reconcile itself to the way in which illness returns one s
olutely to the forces of anatomy?

This essay will address such questions through discussion of Autobio

phy of a Face, Lucy Grealy's account of a nearly twenty-year attempt to s

gically restore a jaw lost to cancer. In this narrative of disfiguring dis

Grealy does more than rewrite the "script" of female or disabled identity,
if the body were simply inert, "raw material" written on by cultural assu

tions. While she does foreground the idea that selfhood is in part narr
by such forms of storytelling as movies, television shows, and medica
course, she also insists that the body exerts its own force, emphasizing
combination of language and body in the formation of self. Indeed, Gr
suggests that thinking in terms of "twoness" at all—of "body" and "m

as discrete, if connected, entities—falsely separates what are interpenetrat
and mutually constitutive aspects of self. Instead, she demonstrates that h

sense of self is inseparable from the condition of her face, even if, or
cially because, that face is also subject to patriarchal attitudes toward fema
Biography 24.1 (Winter 2001) © Biographical Research Center
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beauty and sexuality. Grealy writes not as a passive body onto which other
ness, in the form of gender or deformity, has simply been pasted, but rather

as a uniquely lived body enmeshed in social practice, family circumstance,
and private desire.

To the degree that we cannot detach her narrative from her disease,
Grealy suggests that there is also no way to disentangle the physical from the
psychical—from that thinking mind or writerly consciousness we discover in

Autobiography of a Face. She is her body, so far as we come to know her
through her text. Or as she declares, "my face, my 'self'" (170). At one level,
Grealy risks enforcing the idea that women are bound to the flesh, or that the
"true" nature of the disabled is condensed in their afflicted body parts. In a
similar way, the fact that she records the process of accepting herself after
painful encounters with prejudice may seem to heroize the experience of dis
ease. Yet I would argue that by openly displaying her "freakishness" on the
one hand, and by ultimately coming to terms with a face that does not abide
by societal norms on the other, Grealy enlists corporeal difference to force a
confrontation with cultural mythology—exposing the deleterious effects not
of disease, but rather of normative attitudes about the body and identity that
signify that illness in a particular way. Far from solipsistically "confessing"
her physical pain and hurt pride, or sentimentalizing her triumph over adver
sity,2 Grealy provokes us to reconsider the notion of the disabled figure as a
"normal" body gone wrong, an inversion or perversion of the ideal. The social
construction of the female body as inferior, a deviation from the male, places
the disabled woman at a difficult cultural intersection, where she confronts

not only patriarchal oppression against her gender, but also the oppressions
of an able-bodied culture that "glorifies fitness and physical conformity"
(Hillyer 3). As many critics have noted, the tradition in western ideology of
figuring women in terms of simultaneous monstrosity and lack makes "dis
abled woman" a conceptual redundancy.3 Thus by reconceiving "disability"
as a function not of biology but rather of power and discourse, Grealy denat
uralizes its apparent truth-status as an indicator of "real" corporeal flaws. The
claim she makes for bodily particularity contests an ideology-of-the-same that
would relegate her to the outskirts of cultural acceptance.
First diagnosed with Ewing's sarcoma at the age of ten, Grealy under
went extensive surgery that removed part of her jaw. Over thirty reconstruc
tive procedures followed, a series of largely ineffective surgeries that attest to
her own, as well as her parents' and her physicians', literally invasive need to
normalize her even after the malignancy had been fully removed. Long after

her condition ceases to be life-threatening in what we might pretend is a
strictly "physical" sense, Grealy's disfigured jaw lives on as a badge of sick
ness, a frightening indication of the body's mysterious interiority, a sign of
the mind's failure to remain in control. While Grealy may be said to return

This content downloaded from 141.222.114.59 on Fri, 10 Nov 2017 11:41:31 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

174 Biography 24.1 (Winter 2001)

to a state of health, the condition of her face continues to signify that some
thing is "wrong" with her, to mark her as abnormal. In a culture that "tells
us again and again that we can most be ourselves by acting and looking like

someone else" (222), Grealy's face denies her the sense of legitimate indi
viduality that is guaranteed by identification with the dominant culture's
codes of female beauty, and she internalizes the message that physical differ
ence is the outward manifestation of an "ugliness" of character or self. Unable

to subdue her unruly body or to suppress the signs of her difference, she
describes floundering attempts to adhere to the only available, and ultimate
ly deeply alienating, social narratives of female identity.

In a discussion of her teenage job working pony parties, for example,
Grealy locates an early awareness of who she is "supposed" to be in the
responses of others—especially the "open, uncensored stares" of children
(7)—to the "strange triangular shape" of her face (3). In the exclusive neigh
borhoods of suburban New York, where "house after house looked exactly
like the one next to it" (2), inclusion is guaranteed by "carbon-copy" same
ness, so that Grealy's appearance marks her not simply as one other body
among many, but as extraordinary—at once insufficient and excessive in her
divergence from a physical norm. In the specific social context of "those back
yards" (7), Grealy learns to occupy multiple positions of otherness. She is the
working-class outsider, the Irish immigrant whose homelife lacks the coher
ence of an idealized nuclear family. But it is her face—"pale and misshapen"

(6), "an uneasy reminder of what might be" (11)—that serves as the most
salient ground of her difference. "I was my face," she writes, "I was ugliness.
. . . Everything led to it, everything receded from it" (7). Utilizing not the
adjective but the noun, Grealy represents herself as embodying the very con
dition of ugliness. Ugliness is not just one attribute of a whole person; rather,
she is ugliness itself. In the unabashed stares of children, the averted eyes of
adults, Grealy reads her own form as "dangerous" (11), grotesque, unworthy

of love. The social stigma against corporeal difference, ultimately derived
from arbitrary categories of meaning, subsumes her identity in the visible
sign of her disease.
Autobiography of a Face thus represents illness as more than a function of
brute physiological process or even the very real battle of being "authenti
cally sick" (20). The text begins not with a transparent account of Grealy's
physical condition, but rather with a description of the complex web of power
relations that makes that condition legible. Her "physical oddness" as a "dis
figured child" (4) induces feelings of guilt and embarrassment not because
her face is somehow essentially shameful, but rather because it can be discur
sively construed as less desirable than other, "perfectly formed" children (10).
In the protracted struggle to coordinate her face with a developing subjectiv
ity, Grealy repudiates the structural reality of her face as having anything to
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do with her "true" self, dissociating the effects of surgery from her sense of
who she "is." "Maybe this wasn't my actual face at all," she writes, "but the
face of some interloper, some ugly intruder. ... I began to imagine my 'orig
inal' face, the one free from all deviation, all error" (157). Her language
makes explicit the cultural demonization of atypical bodily forms. Grealy her
self perceives her own "misshapen" face as evidence of her incapacity to con
form, a kind of moralized straying off course that signals a failure of self-mas

tery. In response, she compartmentalizes her sense of self, trying to contain
"ugliness" in her chin and jaw; but when she attempts to integrate the two

sections of her face, "the lower half canceled out the beauty of the upper
half," defeating any sense of identity apart from the belief that her face is a

monstrous anomaly (157). As Rosemarie Garland Thomson states, within
the "totalizing" narratives of cultural expectation, "the deviant characteristic

overwhelms all of a person's other, unmarked aspects" (Extraordinary 34).
Persuaded that her "missing jaw" represents ontological lack, Grealy feels
"completely alone and without any chance of ever being loved" (154, 155).
In Extraordinary Bodies, her study of literary and cultural representations
of disability in America, Thomson contends that "disability" is "an overarch

ing and in some ways artificial category" that encompasses many more forms
of embodied difference than simply the "prototypical disabled person" who
"never leaves a wheelchair, is totally blind, or profoundly deaf' (13). By using
the term to refer to a shifting range of traits—including progressive disease,
acute illness, temporary injury, birthmarks, obesity, amputations, and the
effects of so-called "normal" aging—Thomas emphasizes the point that dis
ablement and dysfunction cannot be neatly confined to a subset of bodies
marked by obvious loss or impairment. Disability might be said to apply to
any physical type other than the white, male, heterosexual, and able-bodied
norm of western culture. A "facial disfigurement" like Grealy's, Thomson
would argue, is psychologically and socially disabling, though not accompa
nied by "physical dysfunction" (14). As Grealy makes clear, her appearance
perpetuates a kind of unhealthiness even after she no longer has cancer.
Undergoing her last round of operations to "correct" the mistake of her face,
she reveals how embedded corporeal difference is in social relations: "Since
physically I was capable of taking care of myself, and medically there was no
need for me to be an inpatient, it did not escape my attention that I was
being treated like a sick person simply because I did not look like other peo
ple" (216). The perceived abnormality of Grealy's facial shape—what Thom
son calls a "formal," rather than a "functional" disability (14)—defines her
whole self. She is seen (and sees herself) as weak, and in need of tending, pity,
or compensation.
Indeed, it is as if cancer is replaced by a form of "illness" that Patricia
Hampl has named "the beauty disease": "the stark neediness and extravagance
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of wanting to be beautiful" (127) in a culture in which "simply . . . [having]
a physical existence" causes many women to see themselves as "freak[s]"
(106), their bodies a fleshly encumbrance they "dra[g] repulsively through
the world" (133). If such self-punition is common among women whose
bodies are deemed "normal" by cultural standards, it is particularly pointed
for those whose bodies defy the normative female form. Encouraged to
measure their worth through their physical shape, but inculcated as well in
western culture's doctrine of psyche over physicality, many women have
recorded responding to the depredations of disease with a sense of shame and
moral inadequacy. Audre Lorde, for example, writes in her journal A Burst
of Light that she "felt like a total failure" on being diagnosed with liver can
cer. The fact that six years spent "living and loving and working to my
utmost potential" could not prevent a recurrence of cancer signals the insuf
ficiency of these specifically mental efforts (290-91), and when Lorde com
plains that the medical community infantilizes her, refusing to recognize
"my responsibility for my own body" (289), she herself implicitly parental
izes her decision-making mind as the protector and caretaker of her physical
form. And Nancy Mairs, whose accounts of coping with degenerative mul
tiple sclerosis emphatically deny the mind/body binary, nonetheless refers to
"all these years trying alternately to repudiate and to control my wayward
body, to transcend it one way or another" (Remembering 234); "Because I
hate being crippled," she writes, "I sometimes hate myself for being crippled.
Over the years I have come to expect—even accept—attacks of violent self
loathing" (Plaintext 16). Discussing such slippage from embodiment to inte
riorized self-deprecation, Thomson writes that "[c]orporeal departures from
dominant expectations never go uninterpreted or unpunished" (Extraordi
nary7). For Grealy, the loss of "self-esteem" associated with physical abnor
mality is inflected in a particular way by the fact that her difference is con
tained in her face (200)—that part of the body that most resolutely signifies
individual identity, and that most immediately determines whether a woman
meets cultural standards of beauty. (So deeply connected is the face with
both beauty and identity, in fact, that it is often not even thought of as a part
of "the body."4) Hearing a woman describe her "feelings of ugliness" after a
mastectomy, Grealy declares that "[h]er problems lay in her perception. Talk
ing with her only strengthened my conviction of the importance in this world

of having a beautiful face" (168). Each new reconstructive surgery is an
attempt to "fix my face, fix my life, my soul" (215), underscoring the way in

which a body read as broken becomes a measure of both social value and
strength of character or spiritual worth.

Some eighteen years after her first series of operations, Grealy writes
that she still "couldn't make what I saw in the mirror correspond to the per

son I thought I was" (219). Her face is an "obstacle" that she can only
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"compensate for, but never overcome" (206); radically disjunct in her imag
ination, "self" and "body" regard each other across a seemingly irreparable
ideological chasm. Paradoxically, however, it is precisely her illness that
grants her some sense, if provisional, of selfhood. Calling herself an "alien"
adrift in a welter of conflicting pressures (7), she ventriloquizes a sequence of
roles aimed at diminishing, even while they depend upon, the singularity of

her face. In the early pages of her memoir, Grealy describes her childhood
self as "desperate for any kind of definition" (11), a performer "dependent"
upon the response of her audience, even a disapproving one, to feel ground
ed in stable subjectivity (4). The disfigurement of her face, freighted as it is
with cultural significance, provides her with what she calls "macabre status"

(11), and she transforms her life as a hospitalized patient into a television
"drama" in which she is "the principal player" (20). Wanting "nothing more
than to be special," she takes on the role of "good" patient (21), one who
bravely endures chemotherapy without crying, to please her emotionally dis
tant mother, and to detach herself from the real physical anguish of the treat
ments. Later, as a college student, she will camouflage her inability to achieve
culturally approved standards of beauty by affecting the stance of androgy
nous poet. Later still, she will act out a kind of hyper-femininity, brandish
ing her sexuality in spiked heels and mini-skirts.
This repeated display of what Grealy refers to as her "various personae"
(38)—or to put it another way, Grealy's narrative emphasis on these semiotic

performances—demonstrates the power of cultural stereotypes to enforce
conformity. Yet even as Grealy strives to fulfill her fantasies of goodness or
prettiness—revealing a more urgent need to be recognized in the psycholog
ical sense as a separate self and a legitimate "author" of desire5—she must also
acknowledge her body's intractable refusal to meet societal expectations. Far
from suggesting that identity is merely a superficial pageant of ideological
tableaux, Grealy's life story coalesces around the persistent presence of her
face. If the juxtaposition of various roles undermines our hold on any single,

essential "Lucy," her ever-changing face becomes an unexpectedly stable
point of reference. It is inescapable as a physical, emotional, social signifier.

Grealy's disfigurement is thus both metaphorical and profoundly real:6 no
number of operations suffices to assimilate her face into a universal model of
normalcy, and in this it serves to underscore the endless particularity of all
bodily types. The futility of Grealy's contorting her "self" in accordance with

cultural demands pertains to all embodied people; we cannot act or write
ourselves out of our bodies.
New stories of physical experience, however—ones that resist stereotypes

of disabled identity and female beauty—can be written. G. Thomas Couser
has demonstrated that disability narratives by men often seek to transcend
the afflicted body, to reassert the primacy of consciousness, attempting to
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recuperate bodily brokenness through claims of a whole, unified, transcen
dent mind. If ignoring or subordinating the body is a potentially bankrupt
move for women autobiographers in general, it would be particularly delim
iting for the disabled woman, merely reifying the cultural invisibility and
unworthiness of her body through narrative suppression. But Grealy manip
ulates the traditional conventions of self-writing to reinterpret the binary of
body and culture, in part by foregrounding the transformative properties of
language, and in part through a dual emphasis on identity as simultaneous
ly "scripted" and physical. The very title of Grealy's memoir speaks to the
fact that bodies are stories (they are constituted in language) and have stories
to tell (they have a reality or "perspective" of their own). By repeatedly jux
taposing depictions of self-as-performative and self-as-corporeal, Grealy sug
gests that neither alone is a hilly adequate point of origin for subjectivity,
and that writing the self means writing as an embodied woman.
In a remarkable instance of the power of words to create reality, Grealy
recounts her realization, after several years of living with disease, that what
she suffered from was in fact cancer:
In all that time, not one person ever said the word cancer to me, at least not in a
way that registered as pertaining to me. . . . Language supplies us with ways to
express ever subtler levels of meaning, but does that imply language gives mean
ing, or robs us of it when we are at a loss to name things? (43—44)

As Grealy goes on to point out, words have histories; to know that she had
"cancer" would be to live in and through some entirely different reality of ill

ness than the one "malignancy" and "Ewing's sarcoma" had already created.
But as the autobiography itself confirms, this revelatory moment does not
inevitably trap Grealy in a prison house of language. Her successive per
formances of culturally authorized identities anticipate a later understanding
that she can redefine herself from within the frame of her face. So too does

this scene of newly appreciating the density of words lead her gradually to
comprehend that because the violence of cultural bias is deployed through
language, it can be rewritten. The child who can "save herself by pretending"
(115), who so desperately longs for "praise and appreciation" that even being
censured as a "freak" feels confirming (123, 155), learns that the very over
lap of physical difference and verbal narrative by which she feels herself
barred From authentic participation in her relationships can make her "the
creator of my own situation" (101).
Grealy also represents illness as a process of coming to awareness of her
physical self, of recognizing the interdependence of its various parts. Describ
ing waking up from her fourth operation—the one that removed the tumor
from her jaw—and limping across her hospital room, Grealy writes that "the
body is a connected thing" (56), no one part of it fully discrete or able to be
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isolated from the whole. There is something irreducible, Grealy implies,
about physical experience, "a meaning that [does] not extend beyond the
confines of one's body" (149). In this sense, the state of being "diseased" both

eludes linguistic representation, and is endlessly available to the narrative
constructions of social prejudice. Grealy thus follows contemporary disabil
ity and feminist theorists in challenging the foundational move of social con

struction—the subsuming of body into culture—which Elizabeth Grosz cri
tiques as the patriarchal, or "logocentric, gesture par excellence" (21). Grosz
encourages replacing the essentialism of binary opposition not with social
construction (itself dependent on the notion of an asocial, "pliable" body)
but by a more subtle, constitutive interaction of body and mind, what she
calls "embodied subjectivity" and "psychical corporeality" (22). Such a model
would collapse the boundary that demarcates the normal from the anomalous
as a discursive fiction, without losing the political and psychological signifi
cance of bodily specificity. In turn, a theory of autobiography as actively
creating the subject within its narrative must also acknowledge the fact that
the narrative is not only written by a body, but simultaneously creates a new
version of the body writing. "Self" or "life" writing might thus more prop
erly be called "auto/body/ography."
The disabled body reminds us that bodies in general cannot be univer
salized. By exposing the boundaries of culture's idealized physical form as
historically specific and ideologically produced, discussions of corporeal dif
ference broaden our collective awareness of what it means to say that sub
jectivity is always already embodied. Grealy reinforces the idea that her dis
ease affords her a vantage point to which she would not otherwise have had
access, mapping out a trajectory from renunciation to reconciliation. Auto
biography of a Face sustains an important tension between the insights gar
nered through illness and Grealy's urgent desire to eschew the face she has
for the fantasy face of idealized beauty. Obsessed with ugliness, convinced
that "only another's love could prove my worth absolutely," since being
"lovable" is synonymous with being beautiful (211), Grealy "blamed my face
for everything," the "tangible element of what was wrong with my life and
with me" (127). Time and again Grealy represents herself as a kind of inter
loper in a world in which she feels displaced:
I was myself only in the briefest of moments. (89)
The only time I was ever completely myself was on Fridays. (90)
I possessed a strong sense of myself. ... I had no sense of myself in relation to . . .
'normal' people. (105)
[TJhe barn became the one place where I felt like myself. (182)
The hospital was the only place on earth where I didn't feel self-conscious. (187)
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Recuperating from chemotherapy alone in a house typically crowded with
siblings, Grealy becomes a "snoop . . . looking for clues to how other people
lived their lives." "What was it like," she wonders, "to be somebody else?"
(81)"
These repeated descriptions of casting herself into other identities—her
intimations that "being herself" is but a fleeting experience quickly over
whelmed by a much stronger conviction that she "was too horrible to look
at," that her "ugliness was equal to a great personal failure" (185)—represent
"self" as a thing deferred, held in suspension as Grealy awaits the face that

will finally feel "'real'" (157):
Beauty, as defined by society at large, seemed to be only about who was best at
looking like everyone else. . . . [E]ach time I was wheeled down to the surgical
wing ... I'd think to myself, Now, now I can start my life, just as soon as I wake up
from this operation. And no matter how disappointed I felt when I woke up and
looked in the mirror, I'd simply postpone happiness until the next operation.

(187)

But the reiterated disappointment that accompanies Grealy's hopes of final
ly achieving the physical ordinariness that paradoxically will make her "an
individual" is countered by the way in which her experience of disease
heightens her attunement to her own body, as well as to the ideological
manipulation of the body in culture. Cancer, chemotherapy, surgery, and
recovery make Grealy "ever more intimate" with her body (57)—with its
"rhythms," its internal organs, its capacity for pain and for healing. "I was
becoming aware that I was experiencing my body, and the world, different
ly from other people," she writes, "aware that normally I'd have no reason to

'feel' my body or know it so intimately" (90-91).7 That slight parentheti
cal—"and the world"—points to the text's larger philosophical argument.
Not just a body in pain, Grealy is precisely a body in the world, and it is that

perspective—"trapped in my own body," as she puts it—that escorts her to
"occasionally even telling myself I was lucky, lucky to have this opportunity

to know such things" (91). "Didn't my face open me up to perceptions I
might otherwise be blind to?" she asks, only in part ironically, since it is her
certitude that she is ugly that leads her eventually to revise her conception of
"real beauty," to coordinate the face in the mirror with "the person I thought

I was, or wanted to be" (150, 175).

By bearing witness to her own implication in myths of feminine beauty
and bodily inadequacy, Grealy's story becomes a politically useful revision, a
blueprint for conceiving of new ways of being. "The journey back to my face

was a long one," Grealy writes (220). She describes years spent "detaching"
herself from any desire other than to manufacture the face that will certify her

worthiness (179). Neither androgynous anonymity nor a spate of "highly
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charged sexual relationship [s]" with men serves adequately to "define" her or

to compensate for the "obstacle of my face" (207, 206). Only by avoiding
any reflection of her own image—not simply in mirrors but even coffee urns,

door handles, tabletops—does Grealy begin to separate a sense of self from
her consuming preoccupation with physical beauty, and to name "the per
son in the mirror" as herself (220, 221). This process of recognition entails
reconceptualizing her face, retrieving it from its isolated position as "a single
stigmatic trait" (Thomson, Extraordinary 11) so that it no longer symbolizes
some generalized inferiority, a deficiency of will or character, a failure to con

trol the body—in short, what A. G. Gowman once termed a whole "gestalt
of disability" (qtd. in Goffman 205). If not looking at her reflection makes
Grealy a temporary exile from her corporeal self, it also allows her to relin
quish what she describes as "the framework of when my face gets fixed, then
I'll start living" (221), and thus to attend to other features of her subjectivi
ty. Finally unable to depend on yet another operation to solve her feelings of
inadequacy, she must incorporate her face, in a kind of literal way, as a mem
ber of her body, to experience embodiment as inextricable from her self. "A
part of me . . . that had always been there," she writes, begins at last "to

speak" (221).

In a well-known moment from her essay "Professions for Women," Vir
ginia Woolf names one of "the adventures of. . . professional life" as "telling

the truth about my own experiences as a body" (288). Her confessed inabil
ity to "solve" this problem, to make the female body visible by authoring
rather than by objectifying it, to grant a woman's corporeal experience a kind
of truth-status, becomes Woolf s legacy to later autobiographers. Narrating
her past in the specific terms of living with illness, Grealy wrests what Leigh
Gilmore calls "the agency of re-membering" from hegemonic discourse, and

textualizes her body back together (239). But the effect—and, I think, the
very purpose—of her "manifesto" (Smith, Subjectivity 157) is not to guar
antee a unified female body, but rather to keep the "story" of the female
body in motion, to show how the "truth" of particular bodies is open to revi
sion. "Telling the truth" thus becomes a necessarily revolutionary act, a ques
tion not of establishing an essential femaleness, but rather of "reconstruct [ing]

the world," as Gilmore argues, "from a subject position not based on exclu
sion, violent differentiation, or the compulsory masking of identities" (239).
Grealy's face is an inescapable component of her identity, but its meaning is
neither inevitable nor imprisoning. While Autobiography of a Face assures us
that Grealy's face participates in the establishment of "who" she is, the text

does not also try to pin down a definition of that person in any closed,
enduring way. Neither a story of triumph over adversity and physical disas
ter, nor one that presumes a stable reference point, a "here" from which the
story is told, Autobiography of a Face is an autobiography without resolution.
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Grealy sets physical disease against cultural dis-ease, suggesting that the
material conditions of surviving cancer and bodily "deformity" help her to
discover something about the "sickness" of living as a woman in patriarchal
culture. In this sense both the body writing and the body described become
thresholds: "neither—while also being both—the private or the public, self
or other, natural or cultural" (Grosz 23), disrupting the kinds of binary cat
egorizations that underwrite cultural oppression. Moreover, by refusing to
deflect the gaze from her body—indeed, by training her own as well as her
readers' gazes steadily on the problematic of "the body" through her own
physical experience—Grealy breaks the habit of accommodating a marginal
self to social pressures by alternately denying and exaggerating difference.8
Yet in a surprising shift at the end of the book, Grealy stages a metaphorical
looking away, insuring that the text, and the identity narrated therein,
remain fluid and open-ended. After nearly a year of avoiding her image, Gre
aly finds that she has "no idea" how her face appears to others, and she looks
into a darkened window "to see if I could, now, recognize myself" (222,
223). Lonely self-scrutiny and stark, clinical detail have characterized most
of Grealy's prior descriptions of her face. Here, however, for the first time in

the book, she does not provide a single detail of her current appearance.
Unexpectedly preventing us from seeing her, Grealy intimates that the only

gaze that matters is her own. At the same time, the implied turning away
from the window transforms Grealy's "visage" from a specimen to be exam
ined to simply one other face in the public, communal setting of the café
(200). The "night-silvered glass" in which her reflection will be indistinct,
and the male companion whose interest in her is at once affirming and irrel
evant—these too suggest that even Grealy no longer sees herself as a solitary
contemptible body part. Rather, the ambiguity of this closing scene presents
identity as always in process, entailing simultaneous connection to and sep
aration from others. Denying us access to her body at precisely the moment
when it seems she might finally accept herself as "normal" or even "attrac
tive," Grealy refuses to capitulate to a desire for definition and closure, and
so culminates her text by rupturing the very identity she had seemed so
actively to seek.
It is this notion of breakage that Grealy brings to the fore to protest the

cultural subject position of a disfigured woman, the paradox of being some
how at once nobody and nothing but body. Far from suggesting that she
ultimately transcends the weight and drag of corporeality, Grealy writes with
her body a radical new form of discourse, a subversive text. Autobiography of

a Face is a declaration of inimitable experience, as well as a window and a
mirror in which we recognize our own bodies, our own contingent selves.
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NOTES

1. Sidonie Smith's Poetics of Women's Autobiography provides a concise history of
generic conventions of traditional autobiography. For excellent discussions that c
bine the concerns of feminist and disability theory, see especially Rosemarie Garl

Thomson's Extraordinary Bodies, and Smith's Subjectivity, Identity, and the Body, as w

as the introduction by Sidonie Smith and Julia Watson to their edited collection G
ting a Life. The present essay is indebted to the pioneering work of Smith, Thoms
and G. Thomas Couser in the fields of women's autobiography and disability theor

2. The complaint that the political efficacy of disability autobiographies runs agro

because they confine themselves too much to a private realm of inferiority and pers

al grief has been made by Lennard J. Davis in Enforcing Normalcy, and by David
Mitchell and Sharon L. Snyder in The Body and Physical Dijference.

3. See Thomson, "Feminist Theory"; Wendell; and Asch and Fine. Couser has also ma
this point.

4. Grealy herself initially makes this distinction, referring to her "body" as "something I
had control over," and writing that, after hours spent working out at a gym, "even I
had to admit I had a sexy body" (208, 207).

5. To be "recognized" in the psychoanalytic sense is to be acknowledged as a separate
individual, as what Jessica Benjamin calls a subject or an "author" of desire. Grealy
records a progression from "detaching myself from my desires," to the "major step for
ward" of starting to "own my desires" (179, 205).

6. Nancy Mairs has made this claim of her own MS and of disability generally. In Waist
High in the World, Mairs writes that "Disability is at once a metaphorical and a mate
rial state, evocative of other conditions in time and space—childhood and imprison
ment come to mind—yet 'like' nothing but itself. I can't live it or write about it except
by conflating the figurative and the substantial, the 'as if with the relentlessly 'what is'"

(58).

7. In her essay "Medical Identity: My DNA/Myself," Kay K. Cook also describes "inva
sive" medical tests as introducing her to "a material selfhood heretofore invisible":
"These continuous reminders of the materiality and interiority of my body challenge
the ways that I have been used to thinking about my 'self' as a fairly disembodied sub
ject" (65).
8. One goal of the disability autobiography is to counter what Thomson has noted about
the extraordinary body in literature—"literary texts necessarily make disabled charac
ters into freaks, stripped of normalizing contexts and engulfed by a single stigmatic
trait" (Extraordinary 11)—by situating the body within the larger context of an indi
vidual's life story. As Couser argues, "autobiography serves to deflect the gaze from a
body that might otherwise trigger stereotypical responses" (182). By highlighting her
experience as a disabled or disfigured body, however, Grealy goes one step further, not
just insisting on the "ordinariness" of putatively different bodies, but also challenging
readers to reconsider the entrenched notions of the body as a thing to be ignored, tol
erated, or overcome by a controlling mind.
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